4 Hrs
Source:
عين ليبيا
Source: عين ليبيا
4 Hrsعين ليبيا
Source: عين ليبيا
4 HrsReady to play
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The author argues that the US–Emirati initiative stalled because its design sought to concentrate power in an understanding between Saddam Haftar and the Dbeibah family, while limiting the role of institutions and excluded local forces. It assumed that an agreement among a small number of power centres would be enough to unify Libya. Domestic and international opposition grew, while Saddam’s rapprochement with Turkey did not become a political guarantee, and the exclusion of Aguila Saleh, together with regional shifts, strained relations with Cairo. The author considers that UN Security Council Resolution 2835, adopted on 30 October 2026 and extending the UN mission’s mandate until the end of October 2027, reaffirmed the UN-led process without endorsing the proposed arrangement—marking the end of the initiative in its original form. But the author warns that the initiative’s failure does not mean the crisis has been resolved, as long as the rules governing the sharing of power, arms and resources do not regulate the relationship between the state and society.
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