شبكة قدس الإخبارية
شبكة قدس الإخبارية
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The article focused on the similarities and differences between Israel's intelligence failures in 1973 and 2023 regarding the anticipation of military surprises. Despite the availability of warnings and information in both cases, security institutions failed to translate them into adequate preparations due to preconceptions and excessive interpretation of the information based on prior assumptions. During the October 1973 war, estimates rejected the possibility of war until certain conditions were met, leading to shock at the surprise attack despite prior warnings. In 2023, preconceived notions about Hamas's desire for calm prevented a proper assessment of the likelihood of a large-scale attack, even though plans and warnings had been in place. The conclusion is that possessing information does not always guarantee understanding or readiness, and overconfidence in the security apparatus, coupled with preconceived notions, can lead to catastrophic surprises.
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