Ukraine's Postwar Order

The article outlines the motives behind Russia’s policy toward Ukraine and Europe, linking them to Moscow’s efforts to preserve its influence in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and the Eurasian Plain, its opposition to NATO’s eastward expansion, and its longstanding pursuit of access to the sea. It notes that Russia voiced these concerns in Vladimir Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich Conference, and that they were later reflected in its military actions in Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014, Syria in 2015, and its attempted invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In Syria, according to Russian officials, more than 60,000 troops and 320 weapons systems were tested. The article also explains that Ukraine has reduced the effectiveness of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, while Sweden and Finland joining NATO strengthened the alliance’s presence in the Baltic Sea. It argues that any settlement to the war and any European security arrangements will require Europe’s involvement and confidence-building measures, since improving one side’s security may be seen as a threat by the other.

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